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Abstract
Zero provides a challenge for philosophers of mathematics with realist incli-
nations. On the one hand it is a bona fide number, yet on the other it is linked
to ideas of nothingness and non-being. This paper provides an analysis of the
epistemology and metaphysics of zero. We develop several constraints and then
argue that a satisfactory account of zero can be obtained by integrating recent
work in numerical cognition with a philosophical account of absence perception.
Introduction
Zero is an intriguing number both mathematically and philosophically. Mathemati-
cally, it plays an important role in our theories of natural, integer, and real numbers.
For instance, when considering an algebraic structure (e.g. a group) under addition,
zero often serves as the identity element (since for any number n, n+ 0 = n). Philo-
sophically, our understanding of zero is tied up with classical questions concerning
the status of non-being, finding consideration already in the work of Parmenidies,
Plato, and Aristotle, through the ‘Continental’ tradition (e.g. Sartre), right up to con-
temporary philosophical debates.
The core issue concerning zero (that we explain in more detail below) is that zero
exhibits something of a dual nature. On the one hand, we regard it as a perfectly le-
gitimate number, on a par with other mathematical entities, and which which we can
meaningfully compute. On the other, it represents ‘nothingness’: While I can have
an experience of two or three objects, an experience of zero objects seems difficult to
conceptualise—there would simply be nothing to experience in such a situation. We
might then wonder how we should think of zero, both epistemologically and onto-
logically. One response would be to be an extreme kind of formalist or fictionalist
about mathematics, and then let our philosophy of notation and proof-theory or fic-
tions deal with the question of zero. While this is a possibility, in this paper I want to
consider how we might account for zero on Realist perspectives, since the problem of
accounting for zero’s null-like nature then becomes more acute. Therefore we make
the following two-part assumption from the get-go:
Mathematical Realism.
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(i) Mathematics is about a mind-independent realm of mathematical
‘entities’ (we do not commit to their being bona fide objects1) which
require an epistemology of how we get to know them.
(ii) A mathematical sentence is true or false depending on whether or
not the relevant entities match the syntax used (i.e. some sort of cor-
respondence theory of truth is appropriate for mathematics).2
The puzzle facing us then is the following:
MainQuestion. How should we should understand zero as a mathemat-
ical entity? In particular:
1. How should we conceive of it ontologically?
2. How is it able to represent ‘nothingness’?
3. How does it fulfill the technical roles it does?
4. How can we provide an adequate epistemology for zero?
In this paper we argue for the following claims:
(1.) We can think of zero as the numerosity property corresponding to an absence of
positive cardinality.
(2.) This yields an account of zero on which it can be viewed as fundamentally of
the same ontological kind as other numbers, with a similar epistemology, yet on
which its distinctive null-like features and technical roles are accounted for.
Here’s the plan: First (§1), we’ll argue for some desiderata on a realist account of
zero. Specifically we argue that (i) zero should be ontologically similar to the other
numbers, (ii) we should have an account of how zero is phenomenologically able to
represent nothingness, (iii) our theory of zero should explain how zero-like number
concepts can fulfill similar technical roles in different contexts, and (iv) we should
provide an epistemology for zero that incorporates these features. Next (§2), we’ll
argue against some otherwise tempting accounts of zero; (i) as a position in a struc-
ture, (ii) as arising out of counting procedures, and (iii) as a set. Each we will argue
fails to meet at least one of the desiderata of §1. We will then argue (§3) that an epis-
temological and ontological story for zero can be obtained by regarding numbers as
properties of collections, and that zero can be viewed as the numerical property cor-
responding to an absence of positive cardinality. We do this by combining elements of
the literature on numerical cognition with recent work in the philosophy of absence
perception. We then (§4) consider some salient objections to the view we proposed,
in particular relating to the relatively late historical and ontogenetic development of
zero concepts. Finally (§5) we conclude with some open questions.
1 Desiderata on an account
We’ll begin with desiderata on a Realist account of the ontology and epistemology
of zero. It is often easiest to see desiderata by considering clearly unsatisfactory re-
sponses to our main question, and this is the strategy we shall initially adopt here.
1They could, for example, be properties or concepts.
2We are sensitive to the fact that the term ‘Realism’ is used in many and varied ways, and just make
this assumption for the purposes of the current paper. See [Jenkins, 2008] (esp. Ch 1) for clarification of
this issue.
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One possible ‘solution’ to the problem posed in the introduction would be to
acknowledge that zero is problematic, and press that we should just be fictionalists
or formalists about zero, whilst retaining realism concerning the other numbers.3
Why is this account bad? Well, aside from the fact that it seems rather ad hoc,
regarding zero as fundamentally ontologically different from the other numbers will
result in a less theoretically elegant correspondence theory of truth on the realist’s
picture. For example, consider the sentence:
“There are exactly six natural numbers less than six.”
This is true on the correspondence theory just in case there really are six natural
numbers less than six. But, given the current account of zero, this is false: There are
really five natural numbers less than six (the numbers 1–5). We would thus require a
version of the correspondence theory on which some way of dealing with fictions is
incorporated, reducing the simplicity of the theory. If an account could avoid these
kinds of awkward changes it would (ceteris paribus) be a better theory. We therefore
propose the following:
Ontological Constraint. Our account of zero should have it ontologically
‘on a par’ with the other natural numbers, in that it is of the same meta-
physical kind and meshes easily with a correspondence theory of truth.
As noted in the Introduction, a feature of zero important for its role in our thought
is how it interacts with concepts of nothingness and non-being. For instance, if you
have zero of a certain object you do not have any such objects at all. This con-
trasts with other numbers and quantities where if you have any positive number
or amount of something you genuinely have some amount of the relevant quantity
or object. This yields the following constraint:
The Phenomenological Constraint. Any philosophy of zero should ac-
count for why it represents ‘nothingness’ within our phenomenological
experience.
This ‘phenomenological’ role for zero in representing nothingness is backed up
by its technical use. As remarked earlier, in algebraic structures under addition zero
serves as the identity element (since for any number or quantity x, x + 0 = x). It
also has interesting interactions with multiplication and division. Since zero repre-
sents nothingness, any multiplication of a number by zero yields zero (i.e. zero is
an absorbing element under multiplication), and zero has no multiplicative inverse
(since, viewing multiplication as repeated addition, any number of times you add
nothingness to itself will fail to yield any positive quantity). Moreover, zero fulfils
these roles in a variety of technical contexts: Acting as both the identity element (un-
der addition) and an absorbing element (under multiplication) in each of the integer
ring, and rational and real fields. This yields the following constraint:
The Technical Constraint. Explain how zero fulfils a similar role in a
variety of technical contexts.
3This attitude to the (closely related to zero) empty set is surprisingly widespread in the founda-
tions of mathematics, especially amongst the early set theorists. Zermelo referred to it as uneigentlich
(‘non-actual’), Dedekind ([Dedekind, 1888], p. 797) excluded its consideration for reasons linked to
problems of non-existence (and duly received criticism, along with Schro¨der in [Frege, 1917]), and
[Fraenkel et al., 1973] regard its use as mere notational convenience. See [Kanamori, 2003] for further
discussion.
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One immediate question that should be addressed in light of the Technical Con-
straint is the sense in which we will be using the term ‘zero’. Does this term for us
refer to the natural number zero, the integer zero, or the real number zero (and many
more besides)? We shall primarily consider how zero features in natural number
contexts, however we shall also argue later that the account we provide in terms of
absence perception can be generalised to other mathematical contexts, satisfying the
Technical Constraint.
Immediately there is something of a tension between the three constraints. For,
on the one hand, we want our account of zero to put zero on an ontological par
with the other numbers. However, on the other hand, we require an account that
explains why zero fulfils the peculiar phenomenological and technical role that it
does, in particular with respect to the fact that it somehow represents ‘nothing’. This
suggests that there will be deep issues in providing an epistemology for zero; the
epistemological story must be both similar to the story for other numbers (since zero
is to be of the same ontological kind), yet also in some sense unique (since zero has
very distinctive phenomenological and mathematical properties). We therefore add
the following constraint:
The Epistemological Constraint. In providing an epistemological story
for zero, do so in a way that accounts for its similarity to other numbers,
but does so in a way that makes clear how it is unique.
As we shall see later, we think that there is an account of zero that satisfies these
constraints by combining existing work on the philosophy of number cognition and
absence perception. For now, however, we move on to consideration of the competi-
tion.
2 Other accounts
In this section, we’ll consider various different existing accounts of zero (or at least
zero-like entities), and explain why they fail to satisfy one or more of the constraints
we outlined above.
2.1 A position in a structure
One suggestion would be to identify zero with a position in a structure. One might
hold the following view:
Structuralism. Mathematical talk should be understood as fundamen-
tally about structures, and mathematical reference should be understood
as to positions in these structures.4
For simplicity, we can consider structures as given graph-theoretically.5 On this
view, structures are to be conceived of as directed unlabelled graphs. For our dis-
cussion, not much hangs on the details of the view, we simply make it to give visual
content to mathematical structuralism.6 For example, we can visualise parts of the
4Views of this kind are [Hellman, 1989] and [Shapiro, 1997]. It does not matter for current purposes
whether the structuralism considered is ante rem or in re.
5We thank [name removed for blind review] here.
6In any case, such a view is roughly inter-translatable with other theories of mathematical structure,
say by conceiving of the structure of the set-theoretic hierarchy as a particular directed unlabelled graph,
with a node for every set and a directed edge between two such nodes representing sets x and y just in
case x ∈ y.
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Figure 1: A visual graph-theoretic representation of an initial part of the natural
number structure under successor
• • • • • · · ·
Figure 2: A visual graph-theoretic representation of part of the real number structure
under less-than
natural number structure under successor (Figure 1), and part of the real number
structure under the less-than relation (Figure 2).
We can then identify zero with the relevant position in the structures. So, for
example ‘0’ denotes the initial position in a natural number structure, or a point in
the real number structure with the other required relationships (e.g. being such that
x+ 0 = x in the addition structure).7
Such a view performs well with respect to the Ontological Constraint. Zero is to
be conceived of as a position in a (relevant kind of) structure, much as the other
numbers and quantities are. Moreover, we have an account of how zero can play a
similar role in different contexts—the available attendant isomorphisms on the struc-
turalist picture facilitate the consideration of how zero can play the same role in dif-
ferent structural frameworks. For example, there will be an isomorphism between
the structure of the integer ring and a substructure of the real field, on which 0 in the
integer ring will be mapped onto 0 in the field structure.
However such a picture fails to account for how zero has any sort of null-like
qualities. Conceiving of structures graph-theoretically (so as composed of points
with arrows between them), 0-positions in structures fail to have any non-being-like
qualities. The initial position in the natural number structure, for instance, is just an
initial position, but has no null-like features.
The case of the 0-position on the real line is possibly even more acute, there it is
entirely arbitrary which position we pick as 0 (similarly with the integers). The same
goes for any conception of structuralism; while we have picked an easily visually
representable version of structuralism, other structuralist pictures also take away
the ‘distinctive’ qualities of zero (aside from its particular place in a structure).
The structuralist sees this (possibly rightly) as a virtue of their view; it is arbitrary
(in a sense) which of the available positions we designate as the null one. For the
brand of realism we are considering, this will not do, however. We need to say
more and explain why zero has the null-like features that it does, rather than simply
stipulating that the relevant position has them. In this sense, the kind of realism we
have adopted in this paper is unabashedly non-structuralist—for this kind of realist
there is more to numbers (especially zero), than mere structural relationships. Later,
7There is a slight challenge of how to visualise binary relations graph-theoretically, however it can be
done, say by factoring the relevant structure through the set-theoretic structure mentioned in the previous
footnote.
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when we provide our positive philosophy of zero, we will argue that we can account
for the arbitrary selection of zero-position whilst at the same time providing null-like
qualities for zero. For now though, we reject the structuralist position as violating
the Phenomenological Constraint (given our initial set up).
2.2 Through counting
Instead, we might try and account for zero via the generalisation of a counting proce-
dure. We might argue as follows: An abstract understanding of counting procedures
is key to mathematical understanding, in particular our understanding of natural
number.8 An abstract understanding of counting procedure might then be argued
to provide an account of zero. We begin with knowledge of one, learn to count,
and slowly learn the numbers two, three, four and so on.9 Given some arithmetical
competence, we then realise that the successor function has an inverse; one can also
subtract 1 as well as add 1 to yield the predecessor instead of the successor. We then
consider what the predecessor of 1 might be, and realise that it must be zero (since
1 − 1 = 0). Thus we can have zero arise out of a understanding of counting prac-
tices; it is the number that would have to precede 1.10 One might then generalise this
account of zero to other areas (such as its role in the real numbers).
The account fares reasonably well with respect to the Ontological Constraint.
Zero is obtained by arithmetical procedures much as the other numbers, and can be
a bona fide entity in this framework. Presumably the Phenomenological Constraint
is also satisfied, since the predecessor of 1 must have null-like qualities.
There are problems, however, when we dig into the details of the epistemological
account. The core problem is that while the account seems appealing, it presupposes
that we already have a concept of zero in order to have it be the predecessor of 1. It
is because we already know that the number that comes before 1 is zero that we can
obtain it from 1 by subtraction.
This plays out with respect to how we generalise the concept of zero to other
structures. A natural way of accounting for our move from the naturals to the inte-
gers is to consider a copy of the positive non-zero natural numbers inverted before 0
(as depicted in Figure 3).
In order to make that move though, we already needed a concept of zero. Sup-
posing then that we lacked a concept of zero, but had a concept of positive natural
number. Our natural number structure would then start from 1 (as depicted in Fig-
ure 4). What kind of structure would a similar inversion strategy yield with this
conception of natural number? What should we say the predecessor sequence of 1
is? When inverting, it is plausible to suppose that we would have the predecessor
of 1 as −1, since that is what one obtains if the structure is ‘flipped’ (as depicted in
Figure 5).11
One could still define versions of arithmetical operations for this structure. For in-
stance addition could be informally defined as “moving the number of places right
in the number line corresponding to the numeral”. With this in place we can de-
fine multiplication in the usual way as repeated addition. Under this conception, we
would obtain a very different arithmetic (for instance, addition would not be com-
mutative, since 1 + −1 = −1 and −1 + 1 = 1). We would also lose various nice
8This is emphasised by numerous authors, but particularly in [Dehaene, 1997] and
[Nieder and Dehaene, 2009], which we shall see some discussion of later.
9A story similar to this is given in [Buijsman, F].
10[Wellman and Miller, 1986] in fact use backwards counting songs ending in zero in their empirical
studies of the ontogenetic development of zero-concepts in children.
11One might also obtain −2 as the predecessor of 1. Our criticisms would remain the same.
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Figure 3: Moving from the naturals to the integers
0 1 2 3 4 · · ·
⇓
0 1 2 3 4 · · ·−1−2−3−4···
Figure 4: The natural number structure without 0
1 2 3 4 5 · · ·
Figure 5: Trying to generate the integers without 0
1 2 3 4 5 · · ·
⇓
1 2 3 4 5 · · ·−1−2−3−4···
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properties of the integers (such as the existence of an identity element for addition).
Nonetheless the fact remains that such a mathematical structure is perfectly legit-
imate, and admits of some meaningful arithmetic (even if very different from our
own). However, without already possessing the concept of zero one would fail to de-
fine a zero concept for this structure. Thus, while it seems initially appealing, filling
in the details of the account from counting seems a deeply problematic.
2.3 A set
A different option would be to identify zero with the empty set, and rely on the
representative qualities of set theory and an attendant epistemology of sets to do the
work. We might, for example, hold the following strong view.
Strong Set-Theoretic Reductionism. Every mathematical object is a set.
Then we could simply identify zero with the empty set, after all, in nearly all
theories of the ordinals (including our canonical one: the von Neumann ordinals)
the empty set is the representative for 0. We would then easily satisfy the Ontolog-
ical Constraint (the empty set is, after all, a set just like the other numbers), and we
would, prima facie, satisfy the Phenomenological Constraint (since the empty set is,
after all, empty) and set theory provides a clear mathematical picture of how it plays
the role it does.
Aside from the fact that we might dispute such a strong set-theoretic reduction-
ism, it is when we examine the Epistemological Constraint that this account begins
to appear problematic. The simple difficulty is that by reducing zero to the empty
set, we have substituted one problem of non-being with another—it seems equally
tricky to explain how we get to know the empty set as it does the number zero.
Not many accounts of the empty set exist in the literature. One can be extracted
from [Maddy, 1998], who suggests (for the physicallistically-inclined philosopher)
that since we just require that the empty set have no members, we can just pick any
old non-set physical urelement we like to do the duty of the empty set. The hierarchy
then built off any such object will have all the regular mathematical properties we
require. Moreover, since the Maddy of [Maddy, 1998] holds that sets are perceivable
and physically located, there is literally a set-theoretic hierarchy located wherever an
object is. The epistemology of the empty set then reduces to the (non-mysterious)
epistemology of the relevant object we pick.
One key problem with this account is that it makes the choice of the empty set
seems arbitrary and open to modal variation. Might we pick a contingently existing
object? If so it seems like the necessity of mathematical truth becomes dubious, since
the empty set (and hence all the relevant pure sets) may fail to exist at certain possible
worlds. Indeed, if we pick a destructible object, it may fail to exist at this world at
some point in the future.
This problem is partially assuaged by [Lewis, 1991]’s account of the empty set,
somewhat similar to Maddy’s in spirit (in that he picks a particular urelement), and
on which he avoids these problems by being a staunch four-dimensionalist about
time, a strong modal realist, and then identifying the empty set with the mereolog-
ical fusion of absolutely everything. However, we might worry about making our
account of the empty set dependent upon such strong metaphysical assumptions
concerning the nature of temporal and modal space.
A different, less ontologically-loaded, response on behalf of the Maddy-style the-
orist is to argue that they were never trying to point to the identity of the empty set,
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but rather set theory could be viewed as explaining what would be true on any hier-
archy of the correct kind, and claims about the empty set should be understood in
this vain. Then worries of contingent existence disappear; we remain neutral on any
one urelement being the empty set.
This response goes so far, but unfortunately does not pass muster. The key prob-
lem is that we would then have a slew of difficult philosophical questions to answer
about the nature of out talk concerning the empty set, some of which are problem-
atic from the perspective of the Ontological Constraint. For example, should we now
say that there are many empty sets or just one? The former is strictly speaking cor-
rect, whereas the latter is what would be true given the ‘relativised’ interpretation
of our mathematical talk. Unfortunately in such a case we have to modify the cor-
respondence theory slightly, since we cannot take our talk at face-value (it has to be
appropriately ‘relativised’). A philosophy of zero that is able to avoid these sorts of
deformations in the correspondance theory is thus (in this respect) preferable.
More seriously for the Ontological Constraint, since the empty set is now not
(strictly speaking) a set, whereas the other sets are sets, we have to do additional
violence (even within a particular relativisation) to the correspondence theory of
truth. In particular, the empty set is not of the same fundamental kind as other
mathematical objects (which are, on Maddy’s view, bona fide sets), and so we require
a work-around in the version of the correspondence theory we employ.
A closely related suggestion (famously championed by Frege) is that we should
identify the empty set with the class abstract:
{x|x 6= x}
which has, as a matter of logic, no instances. We can then (following Frege) identify
the empty set with the collection of all 0-membered concept extensions, i.e. {{}}.
There are technical and philosophical problems with implementing Frege’s the-
ory of number, since for n ≥ 1 the relevant class of concept extensions is a proper
class, necessitating a technical theory of classes and subsequent philosophical inter-
pretation to implement.12 However our main worry here concerns the Epistemo-
logical Constraint. On the Fregean picture, we lack a strong epistemological story
of how we get to know such an entity. While our knowledge of logic is sufficient
to explain how there might be a concept extension with exactly zero instances, it
is unclear what kind of epistemological understanding we have of non-instantiable
contradictory conditions. Such an answer will depend on an analysis of this ques-
tion in the philosophy of logic, and we might not want our account of zero to be so
dependent.13
It therefore seems that there are at least difficulties in implementing an account of
zero that makes use of the empty set. Later, we will see that our account of zero can
in fact complement the Fregean (or any) account of the empty set, elucidating a re-
sponse to these worries, and yielding additional epistemological information about
the empty set. In this sense, our complaint with Frege’s account is not that it is wrong,
but rather that it is incomplete.
12There are options here, we might interpret classes as property extensions (e.g. [Forster, 1995])
or via plural quantification (e.g. [Boolos, 1984], [Uzquiano, 2003]), or via mereological fusions (e.g.
[Welch and Horsten, 2016]).
13Though, of course, Frege would be quite happy with this.
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3 Absence perception in a cardinal context
None of the accounts we considered were able to fully meet the constraints of §1.
However, there was something good about each. The structuralist perspective was
able to easily account for the fact that the position which we select as zero in a real
number line was more-or-less arbitrary. The perspective on which we argued that
zero arose by counting revealed an important feature of its epistemology: It must
mesh well with our counting procedures. And the idea that we could account for
zero as a set showed that our account of zero should interact with our theory of sets.
In this section we provide our positive proposal, specifically:
Zero as an absence. Zero is the numerical property corresponding to an
absence of positive cardinality.
Here is how we will argue for this claim. First, we’ll argue that for the Realist,
numbers conceived of as properties of sets (or pluralities) is an attractive position.
Next we’ll review some of the literature on absence perception. We’ll then argue that
there is reasonable evidence that zero should be understood as a numerical property
corresponding to absences. Finally we’ll argue that this satisfies the constraints we
outlined earlier.
3.1 Numbers as properties
One response to the question of how we should understand cardinal numbers emerges
out of the literature on number perception in the cognitive sciences. Specifically
work by Brannon, Dehaene, Nieder, and others14 argues for the conclusion that small
numbers (four and downwards) can simply be perceived (through a process known
as ‘subitizing’). Larger numbers can be approximately discriminated from one an-
other, and exhibit the so-called ‘distance effect’, two collections closer in cardinality
are harder to discriminate into the larger and smaller than two collections close in
cardinality. This ability is both not specific to humans (having been observed even
in rats), and is multi-modal (it does not matter, for example, whether or not the
array is visual or aural). Moreover, this perception of numerosities is correlated neu-
rally with increased activation of the parietal cortex. It appears that numerosities
are cognitively encoded on a numerical continuum, with the numbers 1–4 precisely
discriminable, and higher numerosities approximately so.
The argument we can put forward then is that the numbers 1–4 are simply fea-
tures of the world that we can perceive (we consider some counterarguments here
in the section on objections). Knowledge of larger numbers can then be obtained by
an analysis of our counting practices. This yields both an ontological answer for the
realist (cardinal numbers are properties of collections), but also an epistemological
one concerning the nature of our perception and mathematical enculturation.
3.2 Numerosity zero
Consider then the following (somewhat silly) example: Suppose that you are really
hungry, and I tell you that there are either three or four sandwiches in the hamper
next to me, and you are welcome to all of them (suppose I can’t remember whether
I packed the last sandwich I made). You are really hungry, and it really matters to
14See here [Dehaene, 1997] for a book-length treatment of the matter, and [Nieder and Dehaene, 2009]
for a relatively recent survey of the literature, and [Dehaene and Brannon, 2011] for a relatively recent
collection.
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you whether or not there are two or three sandwiches there. You are thus primed to
engage your ability to perceive small cardinalities. You open the hamper to find...no
sandwiches! (I secretly ate them all on the bus and then lied.) Might we argue that in
this case that you subitize the zero-cardinality of the set in question? This would then
yield an epistemology of zero: Tokens of numerosity zero can then be experienced
in perception (and subsequently combined with an understanding of our counting
procedures), integrating it into the usual picture of a mental number line.
While it was long thought that this was not possible15, recent studies on rhe-
sus monkeys and children (of 4 years) have challenged this view. For example
rhesus monkeys are able to discriminate empty sets in numerical matching tasks,
showing similar distance effects and neuronal activation of the parietal cortex as
with ordinary numerosity perception, with the distance effect explained by overlap-
ping neuronal activation that decreases as the numerosity of the stimulus increases
([Ramirez-Cardenas et al., 2016], [Okuyama et al., 2015], [Merritt et al., 2009])16. These
distance effects have been observed to transfer to 4 year old children on numerosity-
matching tasks ([Merritt and Brannon, 2013]). Thus, it seems plausible that in fact
numerosity zero is encoded by our faculty of subitizing in a similar way to the other
numbers. We might simply argue that in fact the numbers 0–4 are part of our inher-
ent numerical perception of the world, which can then be integrated with abstraction
and counting procedures to yield a precise concept of natural number. Thus, we gain
knowledge of the number zero by perceiving token instances of zero numerosity and
integrating it within our wider epistemological and ontological story of numerical
cognition and abstraction.
3.3 Absence perception
While we have identified literature from the cognitive sciences that indicates that
zero is perceived as a numerical property of the world, it is a separate philosophical
problem to explain how this data should be interpreted.
We suggest that we can understand the fact that zero numerosity appears to be
perceived can be understood as providing us with a case of absence perception. We
have seen that the cognitive science literature strongly supports the claim that zero-
like properties are perceived as numerosities within the world and integrated into
the usual numerical continuum. The question remains, however: How should we
understand the philosophical character of the experience correlated with these neuro-
logical states? This is not a neurological question, but rather a philosophical one; we
need to to explain how these sorts of experience are integrated into a wider theory
of perception.
Since the neurological data substantially confirms the claim that zero numerosity
can be perceived in the world, the claim that zero is a numerical property looks justi-
fied. We will shortly discuss satisfaction of the desiderata outlined in §1, but for now
we should note that this seems to indicate a satisfaction of the Ontological Constraint
(since zero is a numerosity property, just like the other natural numbers). However,
the neurological data does not explain in and of itself why the Phenomenological,
15See here [Mou and vanMarle, 2014] and [Wynn, 1998].
16Merritt, Rugani, and Brannon are especially explicit here:
“The studies reported here demonstrate the same type of conceptual understanding of zero.
The rhesus monkey apparently treats the class of all empty sets as equivalent and appreci-
ates that empty sets are smaller in numerical magnitude than nonempty sets. Most impor-
tant, the current studies show that the monkey clearly appreciates empty sets as occupying
a place on a numerical continuum.”([Merritt et al., 2009], p. 12.)
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Technical, and Epistemological Constraints should be satisfied. We have an incom-
plete philosophical story, why should zero have the phenomenological and technical
character it does, given that it seems that neuronal activation is similar to the other
numbers? Certainly, the neuronal activation is different, but what philosophical cor-
relates are there of how the distinction between a perception of zero numerosity and
one of two numerosity is of an importantly different kind compared to the distinc-
tion between a perception of two and four numerosity?
In all cases of perception of numerosity zero considered, we have a case where
a subject has been primed to have a cardinal number perception, but where an ab-
sence is a possible stimulus. (In this respect, our ‘silly’ sandwich example from ear-
lier turned out to be roughly analogous to many of the actual experimental set-ups,
and is not so silly after all.) We thus make the following claim: Perception of zero
is a kind of numerosity perception, but is also importantly correlated with absence
property corresponding to a lack of positive cardinality, accounting for its distinctive
phenomenological and technical role.
Certainly, the question of whether absences can be perceived at all is a tricky
philosophical question, since on many theories of perception we only perceive present
objects or scenes.17 This, however, has recently been challenged in the literature on
absence perception, for example in the work of Roy Sorensen18 and Anna Faren-
nikova19. It would take us too far afield to give a full defence of absence perception,
however we can lend plausibility to the epistemological and metaphysical story we
are providing by clarifying the exact nature of the absence perception we are propos-
ing.
[Sorensen, 2008] provides a book-length treatment of absence perception. Many
absences that Sorensen considers have determinate sensible qualities (such as holes,
gaps, the cold, and shadows). However, other absences do not have this quality.
Silence is a good example here. Thinking of silence as a (relative20) absence of sound,
there is no concrete positive sensation accompanying a token experience of silence, as
there is with seeing darkness or feeling cold. For this reason, Sorensen claims:
“Hearing silence is the most negative of perceptions: there is nothing pos-
itive being sensed and no positive sensation representing that absence.”
[Sorensen, 2008], p. 272
It is interesting that zero shares many properties with silence. For example, in-
stances of zero numerosity (like silence) can be located; I can both hear the silence in
the cockpit of an unconscious pilot who has left their microphone on21 and see zero
sandwiches in the hamper. Moreover, zero is (like silence) both detectable and di-
rectly perceivable; if I install a device to the outside of a box that emits a high-pitched
tone when the contents of a box contain no items of a certain kind (respectively,
when the volume inside the box is below a certain level), I can detect zero numeros-
ity (respectively silence) inside the box without perceiving it. Especially interesting,
17See [Sorensen, 2008] and [Farennikova, 2013] for further discussion of this point. Good examples
of theories of perception (in the case of sight) of this kind are those found (as Farennikova notes) in
[Marr, 1982], [Gibson, 1966], and [Dretske, 1969].
18See [Sorensen, 2008].
19See [Farennikova, 2013].
20We say relative, because it seems false that a token instance of silence must be accompanied by a total
absence of sound waves. In music, for example, we can say that the performer(s) in John Cage’s 4’33” are
silent, despite the fact that they may be making slight noises. The important point is that they are silent
relative to the usual conventions of a musical performance. Some (e.g. [Davies, 2003], Ch. 1) treat this as
indicative of the impossibility of silence, but see [Sorensen, 2008], p. 287 for an effective rebuttal.
21This example is from [Sorensen, 2008], p. 269.
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however, is the following similarity between zero and silence; zero perceptions are
precisely characterised by a total lack of expected stimulation, and so there are no
particular qualities associated with zero other than its ‘zero-ness’ (for example, zero
is not coloured in the same way as darkness, which is black in colour). This resonates
with Sorensen’s account of silence expressed in the quotation above.
Drawing on this character of zero, one can then view perceptions of zero as the
kind of absence considered by [Farennikova, 2013]. There she considers a model
of absence perception on which absences are understood through mismatches. For
example, suppose I am looking for and failing to find my keys in the usual expected
places. On her picture, I develop a rough visual template of my keys in my working
memory and attempt to project it onto my visual surroundings. When the template
fails to project accurately onto my surroundings, I am aware of a mismatch between
an expectation arising from the working memory projection and the world, yielding
a sensation of absence.22
Farennikova’ Mismatch Model can be adapted to the current case to provide an
elegant interpretation of perception of zero numerosity. In a situation of numerosity
perception we are projecting possible numbers of objects to be (possibly approxi-
mately) matched. In a token occurrence of zero perception, we have an expectation
arising from projection of positive numerosity in a cardinal context mismatched with
a lack of any number of things. Thus, in addition to understanding zero as a numeros-
ity property, we should also understand it as an absence property.
The suggestion that we should understand zero an absence perception arising
from mismatches meshes well with the fact that subitizing is often explained via the
use of an object-tracking mechanism. Thus, an absence of positive numerosity (i.e.
a token perception of zero numerosity) precisely indicates a mismatch between an
object tracking mechanism and a lack of objects.
Two points are in order here. First, despite the fact we have characterised zero
perception as expectation violation (in the sense of mismatches between the world
and expectations arising from projections), one can still expect (in a different sense)
a perception of zero numerosity. Suppose I tell a younger sibling to always leave at
least one sweet in the jar (out of politeness), but lacking self-control they usually eat
all of them. I come down in the morning, expecting to find the jar containing zero
sweets, and predictably it does. How can I have a perception of zero numerosity via
mismatch if I actually expect zero sweets?
The answer is already dealt with in [Farennikova, 2013] and we adapt that re-
sponse to the current context. Despite the fact that I doxastically expect there to be
no sweets, I nonetheless project the positive numerosity of sweets onto my surround-
ings in an attempt to discern the mismatch and see the absence. In other words,
I assess my doxastic expectation that there won’t be any sweets by comparing the
world against a perceptual expectation. The objection that I can predict the relative
absence conflates two notions of expectation; the expectation that arises from beliefs
and the cognitive expectation that arises from projecting in the process of a search.
A second interesting point here is that the case of zero proposed, if satisfactory,
reveals a generality to Farennikova’s model. [Farennikova, 2013] is primarily con-
cerned with visual absences, but later conjectures that the account can be generalised
to other modalities. The current proposal suggests that this model may be very gen-
eral. We know that numerosity is perceivable in a variety of modalities (e.g. sound as
22Interestingly, Farennikova holds that there may be challenges in applying her account to silence
([Farennikova, 2013], p. 452), citing the example of no longer hearing the footsteps of a retreating lover.
She argues that there may be difficulties in saying that one hears the silence when no mismatch occurs.
We are happy to accept the conclusion that her agent fails to hear the silence when no footsteps are heard
without mismatching; a mere failure to hear footsteps does not entail hearing silence.
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well as vision). Given the current account, there is no obstacle to mixed modalities of
absence perception. Consider a case where we are asked to perceive the total num-
ber of tones heard and circles displayed on a screen. No circles are displayed and no
tones sound. It seems reasonable to suggest, if we accept the current proposal, that
this is a multi-modal absence of both visual and auditory stimulus at the same time.
So, to sum up the positive account, we have proposed that zero should be under-
stood as follows:
1. A numerosity property corresponding to a type of absence perception.
2. This is naturally understood through a model of absence perception as a mis-
match between projections and the world.
3. The property corresponding to zero is not tied to any one modality, and indeed
can be instantiated multi-modally.
3.4 Satisfying the constraints
We now have a positive proposal on the table. Let us see how it fares with respect to
the earlier outlined constraints.
The Ontological Constraint is very easily satisfied. Zero is understood as a prop-
erty corresponding to numerosity just like the other natural numbers. Conceived as
a property, it is in exactly the same ontological standing as the other natural num-
bers, which may vary according to philosophical preference. As a result, we can
leave our correspondence-style theory of truth exactly as it is.
Moreover, the Phenomenological Constraint is also clearly satisfied. Though we
have acknowledged that zero is a numerosity property, it is the only number charac-
terised by an absence property (and the accompanying mismatch model explanation
of absence), which accounts for its distinctive null-like quality in our phenomeno-
logical experience.
For similar reasons, the Epistemological Constraint is satisfied. We can integrate
zero into the usual story of numerosity-perception and counting procedures as given
in the cognitive science literature. Again, it is the only number within this story
which has an additional component of absence perception provided by the mismatch
model, giving it a distinctive epistemological flavour.
The Technical Constraint is a little more complex. Our account does deal with
the role of zero in a natural number context, possibly supplemented by feeding it
into the usual accounts of numerosity cognition and natural number epistemology.23
However, we have thus far only explained its role as a natural number and not the
role it plays in other technical contexts (such as in the integers, real numbers, or in
the context of set theory).
However, we contend that our account provides the foundation for a generali-
sation to these contexts. In the case of the integers for example, we can generate an
account of why the integer sequence should look as it does rather than going straight
from 1 to −1 in considering an inverse for the successor function. In this way, inte-
grating our account of zero into what was good about the attempt to explain zero in
terms of counting procedures, we see that it meshes well with such procedures, even
if it is not fully characterised by them. Within the integer ring, we then have that
zero can play the role that it does as (for example) an absorbing element for multi-
plication but for the deeper conceptual reason that no matter how many times one
repeats an absence, one will always return an absence. Thinking of the real numbers
23For example, [Dehaene, 1997] and [Pantsar, 2014].
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as giving mathematical structure to the notion of line, we can think of the origin as
providing the point from which the length of particular lines can be measured. Zero
itself can then be thought of as an absence of positive length (since the distance from
the point 0 to the point 0 is zero). This explains the relationship between the natural
number zero and the real number zero; both are characterised by absences of a sort,
the former in numerosity and the latter in length. But it is this absence-like quality
that implies the similar role of zero as an identity element for addition in the natural,
integer, and real number contexts.
Moreover, conceiving of the real number zero in this way shows that while it may
be arbitrary which point we pick on a line to serve as the real number zero, once that
point has been picked it has a privileged status; it is the unique point on that line
that has an absence of distance from that pre-picked point. So while our Structural-
ist from earlier said something right about the zero point; selecting it is arbitrary,
we can say that there is nonetheless more to zero in the context of the real numbers
(more in line with our Realist’s position). Similarly in set theory, where the role of 0 is
normally played by the empty set, we can see that the empty set is the unique object
that has cardinal numerosity zero. Applying this to the Fregean account; we can see
that the class abstract {x|x 6= x} will always denote a concept with numerosity zero
instances, yielding information about how our epistemology of numerosity percep-
tion interacts with class abstraction operators. Moreover, the account we have pro-
vided here can supplement and complement existing explanations of ℵ0. We might
take numerosity zero as the beginning for the processes-as-objects account of ℵ0 in
[Pantsar, 2015], or as an initial point in the conceptual blending account provided in
[Nu´n˜ez, 2005]24.
Our answer to the Technical Constraint is somewhat partial in that a full account
of how zero figures in many mathematical contexts would require a satisfactory epis-
temology for each of these contexts, each of which would require lengthy treatments
in themselves. However, we have shown that our account is flexible in that it can
be integrated into a wide variety of different accounts, and that for many of these it
performs well in explaining the role of zero.
4 Objections
We seem to now have an attractive epistemological and metaphysical account of zero
for the Realist, responding well to the constraints and indicating ways in which the
account can be worked into further study. There are, however, some salient objec-
tions. This section explains and addresses these objections, and shows how they help
to clarify the account.
One line of attack is to put pressure on the account of numbers as understood
via subitizing and counting procedure, and with numbers integrated into a men-
tal number line. This has been pursued in the cognitive sciences by Nu´n˜ez25 who
argues that cultural factors are important in determining our epistemology of num-
ber (rather than it being ‘hardwired’ by numerosity perception and then made pre-
cise by an understanding of counting procedure). In the philosophical literature,
[Buijsman, F] argues that the ‘approximate’ feature of the object-tracking subitizing
procedure fails to deliver the precision required for properly arithmetic understand-
ing and that subitizing fails to explain the ontogenetic delay in infants progressive
24Though Nu´n˜ez would not accept this in virtue of other theoretical commitments, such as his rejection
of the role of numerosity perception in providing a cognitive theory of number.
25See, for example, [Nu´n˜ez, 2009] and [Nu´n˜ez, 2011].
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understanding of the meanings of the numbers 1–3.
While we find the account of natural number as understood through counting
procedure and the approximate number perception system to be plausible, let us
suppose that Nu´n˜ez and Buijsman are in fact correct and that number epistemology
should be understood through different means. Even accepting this, we contend that
our account can still play an important role in the explanation of the epistemology
of natural number.
Even if, as argued by Nu´n˜ez, our arithmetical practices are substantially cultur-
ally grounded, it remains the case that such cultural practices containing a use for 0 in
their mathematics (in any reasonable sense of what 0 means) will use it in such a way
that it can be used to represent an absence of positive numerosity. Therefore, while
we may accept that our story of zero in this case is not constitutive of the concept
of zero, it nonetheless has an important role to play in explaining our epistemology
of zero. We would still be use zero as a numerosity property to track absences of
objects, absence perception and the approximate number would still be features of
our cognitive make-up, it is just that additional epistemological steps would need to
be made in connecting the epistemology to the perception. Similar remarks apply to
[Buijsman, F]’s account of the natural numbers as understood through Hume-style
principles. Even if the epistemology is not exactly as we have described it, the under-
lying account of zero as a numerosity property related to absence perception can be
transferred to these cases.
Two objections relate to the cultural and infant specific ontogeny of zero. The first
point is the following: Historically speaking, the use of zero was a comparatively late
technological advance. Notation for zero first appears in around 400BC in Babylo-
nian mathematics, but it was not until the 7th century AD that we have record of it
being used as a legitimate number in computation in the work of Brahmagupta.26
The historical and cultural story is mirrored by the ontogenetic development of
children. For example, children of between three and four years of age can com-
monly count backwards to zero, however fail to integrate this adequately with their
other numerical knowledge, often responding that one is smaller than zero.27
This raises the following objection: If zero is, as we’ve suggested, to be under-
stood in terms of numerical absence perception, and this numerical absence percep-
tion is, roughly ‘hardwired’ in the human brain, then why is zero not a culturally
and historically ubiquitous phenomenon, presenting contemporaneously with other
numbers? Similarly in the case of child development, why is it, if zero is linked to
the same perceptual faculties that give us knowledge of the very smallest cardinal
numbers, that manifestation of its knowledge in the ordering of cardinal numbers
presents much later (at around 6 years28)?
We think that these points can be answered. The key point is that just because
something is a perceivable quality, does not necessarily mean that it is either easy
or necessary to integrate into a theory of how we navigate the world. It might just
26For an excellent survey of the history here, and an account of zero in the cognitive sciences, see
[Nieder, 2016].
27Again, see [Nieder, 2016] for a concise survey of some of the cognitive science literature.
28See here [Wellman and Miller, 1986] for an early study into ontogenetic development of zero and
[Merritt et al., 2009], p. 3:
“Together, research with babies and children suggests that both in symbolic and in nonsym-
bolic form, children’s concept of empty sets lags behind that of nonzero whole numbers. In
addition, children’s understanding of zero does not happen all at once, but rather, children
gradually acquire the important elemental properties of zero before those elements are fully
integrated.”
16
be that in virtue of it being a kind of absence, zero is more difficult to integrate into
conceptual systems. Indeed, we might hypothesise that the Mismatch Model would
account for this; a failed search given a projection might well be more computation-
ally and conceptually taxing than an immediate successful matching. This might
then account for why children (and in fact mature adults) find it more difficult to
compute with zero, and why a full understanding presents later.
Moreover, in the historical context it is unclear that we need to differentiate the
perception of an absence of some objects or stuff from a the absence of a positive nu-
merosity of that particular object or stuff. Suppose we are in some sort of ‘state of na-
ture’ context where nutrition is scarce and key to survival. Is the distinction between
whether I have an absence of bananas or an absence of a positive numerosity of bananas an
important one? Roughly they come down to the same nutritionally relative state of
affairs; I have no bananas to eat.
Culturally speaking, the importance of distinguishing an absence of positive nu-
merosity zero as opposed to absence simpliciter only becomes acute when we require
a relatively sophisticated ideas. Issues like the lending of money, positive and neg-
ative charge, and scientific theories requiring algebraic structures utilising zero are
the applications that require zero rather than mere absence. Zero then enters the pic-
ture in order to mediate the distinction between the positive and the negative, and
provide an appropriate numerical property that can fill the required algebraic roles.
But until such needs arise, there is no especial pressure to assert that a lack of nu-
merical competence with a particular arithmetical concept is indicative of a lack of
perception of the property corresponding to that concept.
Consider, as an analogy, the Piraha˜ people who have an approximate proto-
arithmetic involving the words “one”, “two”, and “many”. In their proto-arithmetic
one plus one is two, two plus one is many, and many plus one remains many.29 Does
this threaten our epistemology of natural number as given by an integration of nu-
merosity procedure with counting practices? It seems that the Piraha˜ have all the
pieces (albeit a different counting procedure). Yet they fail to have a determinate
concept for three, despite the fact that they are (presumably) regularly experiencing
numerosity three perceptions.
We contend that this does not threaten the account of natural numbers as under-
stood through numerosity perception and counting procedures. The reason is the
same as in the zero case; while they may be having perceptions of a certain kind,
this does not entail that they have sophisticated concepts that can apply to them.
We do not need to maintain that counting and numerosity perception has to entail
a satisfactory epistemology of number, just that it can for the particular arithmeti-
cal concepts we employ.30 Similarly for zero, it may very well be that one can have
zero numerosity perceptions without possessing a concept and associated language
to describe them.
5 Conclusions and open questions
We have argued that we can come to a reasonably satisfactory account of zero on
a Realist philosophy of mathematics by holding that zero is a kind of numerosity
property corresponding to an absence of positive numerosity. This account is able
to explain both the ontological contiguity of zero with the other numbers, whilst
29See [Gordon, 2004] for the details.
30[Pantsar, 2014] makes a related point (although he is less confident that the practice of the Piraha˜
can be described as proto-arithmetical) that the use of the perceptual approximate number system might
underdetermine the eventual arithmetic adopted.
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providing an account of why zero should play the role it does in our phenomenology
and mathematical theories, as well as how its epistemology is distinctive. As we’ve
just argued, salient criticisms can be responded to.
There are, however, some open questions regarding zero both from a philosoph-
ical and cognition perspective. On the cognitive science side, whilst we have argued
that zero can fulfil particular philosophical and mathematical functions if viewed as
a kind of absence property, this part of the story has not yet been corroborated by
empirical evidence, including neuronal activation. Part of the problem here is that
it is unclear if there is specific neuronal activation corresponding to absence percep-
tion in general, or whether absence perception is rather a higher-level philosophical
concept. Nonetheless, examining how token perceptions of zero and other kinds
of absence interact would be an interesting comparison in providing a full picture
of how philosophical concepts and neurological facts interact. We therefore ask the
following:
Question 1. How does zero behave empirically with respect to other kinds of ab-
sence perception, including comparison of neuronal activation?
Our next question concerns the fact that, as hinted to in the text, there seems no
barrier to considering numerosities instantiated multi-modally. We know that hu-
man (and animal) perception of numerosity can be discriminated in different modal-
ities, but this is not the same thing as analysing them in different modalities simul-
taneously. As far as we know, this has not been studied in detail, and so we ask the
following for the specific case of zero:
Question 2. What empirical data can we glean from studies involving the multi-
modal instantiation of numerosity zero?
This also suggests a related question for the philosophical literature:
Question 3. How does the possibility of perceiving a multi-modal absence inform
our understanding of absence perception?
Finally, we leave open a question concerning how the account provided gener-
alises to other cases. Earlier, we remarked that our account of zero can be integrated
into other accounts of mathematical structures that make use of zero (e.g. the real
numbers, set theory). However, we did not fill in the details of the account. The
following question is therefore important:
Question 4. What are the details concerning how we integrate this account of zero
into the wider practice of mathematics, and how does this account inform the phi-
losophy of those areas?
We are hopeful that an answer to these questions will yield an account of mathe-
matics on which the fundamental importance of zero as both a technical device and
philosophically distinctive entity is developed. For now, we take ourselves to have
made an initial step in this direction.
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